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Foreign exchange market intervention in EMEs:  




The recovery of the global economy that followed the Lehman bankruptcy in September 
2008 has been associated with renewed foreign currency inflows to emerging market 
economies (EMEs), reflecting a combination of capital inflows and current account 
surpluses.
2 The resulting exchange rate appreciation and the question of what do about it 
have raised concerns that were last heard prior to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Many 
emerging market central banks have responded to appreciation pressures by intervening in 
foreign exchange markets, thus expanding central bank foreign assets and balance sheets. 
An important concern is that large changes in central bank balance sheets induced by 
foreign asset growth will hinder the conduct of monetary policy.  
To shed light on some of these issues, this paper will discuss recent trends in the balance 
sheets of central banks and the motives for accumulating foreign assets (Section 2). 
Section 3 discusses issues raised by the use of alternative approaches to the sterilisation of 
foreign exchange market interventions. Some implications for commercial banks are briefly 
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  The balance sheets of central banks in emerging markets  
2.1  Recent developments in central bank balance sheets  
Table 1 shows a simplified central bank balance sheet to illustrate the implications of foreign 
asset accumulation. Assets comprise net foreign assets and domestic assets (including 
government securities).
3 Liabilities include currency in circulation and reserves of commercial 
banks (ie monetary liabilities); and government deposits, central bank securities and other 
liabilities (ie non-monetary liabilities). Appendix Tables A1 and A2 show selected balance 
sheet assets and liabilities for a set of emerging market central banks.  
According to Table 1, if we take equity capital as given, the accumulation of foreign asset 
must be financed by either the sale of domestic assets or the issuance of domestic liabilities. 
                                                  
1   This paper draws on work by Andrew Filardo and joint work with Carlos Montoro. The author thanks Stephen 
Cecchetti, Dubravko Mihaljek, Philip Turner and participants in the meeting for comments. Emese Kuruc, 
Jimmy Shek, Agne Subelyte and Alan Villegas provided research assistance.  
2   Recent commentary suggests that capital flows in 2010 may have been higher. At this writing, the Institute for 
International Finance (2011) estimates that net private capital flows to a set of EMEs rose by 50% (which was 
more than anticipated) to more than $900 billion in 2010.  
3   We use foreign assets and foreign reserves interchangeably in our discussion, although the latter are the 
more liquid component of the former.  66  BIS Papers No 57
 
 
As noted in CGFS (2009), one simple measure of this type of financing is the excess of 




Stylised central bank balance sheet  
Assets  Liabilities and capital 
Net foreign assets  Monetary liabilities 
Domestic assets    Currency in circulation 
    Reserves of commercial banks 
 Non-monetary  liabilities 
   Government  deposits 
   Central  bank  securities 
   Others 
 Equity  capital 
 
Until the late 1990s, this “financing gap” was either small or negative in many EMEs. In other 
words, foreign reserve assets and currency in circulation were of a similar order of 
magnitude. With economic growth and the central bank purchase of foreign reserves, the 
rising demand for cash has meant that liabilities issued by the central bank had to increase 

















AR = Argentina; BR = Brazil; CL = Chile; CN = China; CO = Colombia; CZ = Czech Republic; DZ = Algeria;
HK = Hong Kong SAR; HU  =  Hungary; ID = Indonesia; IL = Israel; IN = India; KR = Korea; MX = Mexico;
MY = Malaysia; PE = Peru; PH = Philippines; PL = Poland; RU = Russia; SA = Saudi Arabia; TH = Thailand;
TR = Turkey; VE = Venezuela; ZA = South Africa. 
1  Net of currency in circulation. Countries are listed, in descending order, according to the latest information 
available for 2010.    
2  For the Philippines and Venezuela, November 2009. 
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics, World Economic Outlook. 
                                                  
4   If currency in circulation is issued only when there is demand for it, foreign asset acquisition would have no 
inflationary consequence and could be netted out from assessments of the impact of reserve accumulation on 
the central bank balance sheet. BIS Papers No 57  67
 
 
Since 2002, however, total central bank assets have grown significantly, in the case of 
Algeria, Hong Kong SAR and Saudi Arabia by 40–80% of GDP (Graph 1). As a result, central 
bank balance sheets in EMEs have expanded considerably: the median ratio of total central 
bank assets to GDP was around 24% in 2010.
5 Central banks with asset-to-GDP ratios that 
are well above the median include financial centres (Hong Kong SAR and Singapore); oil 
exporters (Algeria and Saudi Arabia); and some Asian economies (China, Malaysia and 
Thailand). Central banks with balance sheets well below the median are mostly inflation 
targeting regimes (Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Mexico, Poland, Turkey and South 
Africa) but also Venezuela. 
 
Graph 2 
Foreign exchange reserves minus currency held by the public  
As a percentage of  
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1  Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
2  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.    
3  The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Turkey and 
South Africa.    
4  M1, also called narrow money, comprises transferable deposits and currency outside deposit
money banks.    
5  M2 is a broad measure of money which comprises, in addition to M1, time, savings, and foreign 
currency deposits of resident sectors other than central government.  
Sources: IMF; Datastream; national data; BIS. 
 
                                                  
5   There are many difficulties in using and interpreting central bank balance sheet data. To keep problems of 
comparability to a minimum, we follow Ulrich and Stella (2008) and rely on IMF IFS data. Nevertheless there 
appear to be visible differences between IMF and central bank-reported data in some countries. 68  BIS Papers No 57
 
 
In any case, central bank assets in emerging market economies are generally larger than in 
advanced economies, even after taking into account recent sharp increases in the size of 
central bank balance sheets in the United States, the euro area and the United Kingdom, 
among others. In addition, net foreign assets account for the bulk of total central bank assets 
in EMEs – the median share was 87% in 2010 (Appendix Table A1). The share of net foreign 
assets tends to be lower outside the Asian region, but it is still typically much larger in 
emerging markets than in advanced economies. Foreign reserves in emerging markets also 
tend to be large relative to the size of financial systems (Graph 2). 
2.2  Motives for accumulation of foreign assets 
Will accumulation of foreign assets by central banks continue? Continued recovery in 
advanced economies will have mixed effects on foreign currency flows to EMEs, which have 
driven accumulation of central banks’ foreign assets in the past. On the one hand, it will tend 
to increase current account balances in EMEs (which fell during the 2008–09 crisis) by 
narrowing growth differentials that currently favour EMEs. On the other hand, it may reduce 
capital flows to EMEs by narrowing currently wide interest rate differentials. Much will also 
depend on the extent to which central banks intervene in foreign exchange markets. Three 
elements will play a role.  
First, some central banks with floating exchange rates appear to have stepped up the pace 
of foreign exchange market intervention compared with the early 2000s (eg Brazil, Israel, the 
Philippines and Thailand), resulting in faster growth of foreign assets. Reasons could include 
greater concern about the possible impact of exchange rate fluctuations on inflation and 
concerns about competitiveness, particularly if there appears to be exchange rate 
overshooting or misalignment.
6 The increase in central bank foreign assets in Hong Kong, 
which has a fixed exchange rate regime, has also been large.  
Second, since the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008, some central banks 
appear to have concluded that their precautionary holdings of foreign reserves were too high, 
while others concluded the opposite.
7 Thus foreign reserve cover for short-term external debt 
(which was generally well above the rule-of-thumb threshold of 100%) has fallen in a number 
of economies where previously it was higher than average (eg Brazil, China, India and 
Malaysia; see Appendix Table A3), but has increased in other countries where it was lower 
than average (including Chile, Mexico and Peru). In some cases, foreign reserve cover has 
been increased in response to a perceived increase in risks to the global outlook.
8 
Third, the costs of foreign asset accumulation remain significant. Appendix Table A4 shows 
that sterilisation costs (reflecting the differential between the domestic interest cost of 
financing foreign asset positions and the interest rate earned on foreign assets) are quite 
                                                  
6   However, the evidence suggests that – possibly because of the adoption of inflation targeting – the pass-
through from exchange rates to inflation has fallen. For a recent discussion of the exchange rate pass-
through, see the paper by Vargas in this volume. 
7   For a model showing factors that may cause actual foreign reserve holdings to diverge from the rule-of-thumb 
threshold of 100% (the so-called Guidotti-Greenspan criterion), see Jeanne and Rancière (2011). The factors 
they consider are the probability and the size of a sudden stop in capital inflows, consumer risk aversion, the 
opportunity cost of holding foreign reserves and (in an extended framework) the role of foreign reserves in 
reducing the probability of a sudden stop.  
8    For example, Sidaoui et al discuss in their paper in this volume foreign reserve adequacy and Mexico’s 
decision to increase foreign reserves. In addition, the Central Bank of Chile announced on 3 January 2011 a 
foreign currency purchase schedule to raise foreign reserves to “a level that is comparable with those in other 
economies similar to Chile”, highlighting a number of risks in the global outlook (escalating financial tensions 
in Europe, persistent high unemployment rates in developed economies and sharper adjustments in some 
EMEs facing inflationary pressures). See http://www.bcentral.cl/eng/press/other/pdf/05012011a.pdf.  BIS Papers No 57  69
 
 
high in a number of countries, ie close to or exceeding 1% of GDP assuming full sterilisation. 
For countries with large foreign asset holdings, valuation losses that could be associated with 
a 10% appreciation could be even larger. High sterilisation costs may partly explain the 
tendency for foreign reserve cover to decline in some EMEs.
9 
These findings suggest that large foreign reserve holdings could significantly weaken central 
bank financial strength due to costs of financing (or sterilisation) and if exchange rate risks 
are realised. One measure of financial strength, the return on average assets (ROAA), was 
on a declining trend between 1998 and 2007, a period which included episodes of significant 
central bank foreign asset accumulation (Graph 3). While the return on average assets rose 
during the period of sharp exchange rate depreciation in EMEs in 2008, it has since once 
again turned downwards. 
 
Graph 3 
Return on average assets in emerging market central banks, 1995–2009
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1  Simple average and median of the return on average assets for the central banks of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey. 
Sources: Bankscope; BIS calculations. 
 
Graph 4 reveals visible differences in performance of the return on average assets across 
emerging market regions. The return on average assets in Asia tends to be higher and less 
volatile than in other regions. This could partly reflect the impact of lower exchange rate 
volatility on central bank balance sheets. Episodes of exchange rate appreciation would tend 
to be associated with lower return on average assets, although this outcome will depend in 
part on accounting procedures.  
There are two views on what lower returns on assets – or outright losses – imply for central 
bank credibility. On the one hand, losses mean that central banks are taking steps to drain 
liquidity created by foreign reserve accumulation, ie that central banks are serious about 
maintaining monetary control. On the other hand, losses raise questions about the 
sustainability of monetary policies and the central bank’s ability to resist political pressures to 
                                                  
9  In principle, carrying costs could be reduced by diversifying reserve assets, including buying more EM debt. In 
practice, the scope for such diversification is limited because of the small supply of higher-yielding investment 
grade assets: only $5 trillion in sovereign debt (of which $2 trillion in smaller advanced economies and 
$3  trillion in investment grade EMEs) is available, compared with $38 trillion in the major advanced 
economies. The supply of EME domestic debt securities is also relevant for sterilisation, as discussed below. 70  BIS Papers No 57
 
 
inflate. In line with this second view, an empirical study by Klüh and Stella (2008) finds that 
lower central bank financial strength is associated with higher inflation. 
 
Graph 4 
ROAA for central banks by region, 1999–2009 
In per cent 
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The vertical line marks the date of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on 15 September 2008. 
1  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.    
2  Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.    
3  The Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Russia, South Africa
and  Turkey.    
4    National currency per US dollar indexes, 1999 = 100.       
5  Simple  average  across  region 
countries. 
Sources: IMF; Bankscope; BIS calculations. 
3. Sterilisation  and  implications  for central bank balance sheets
10 
How a central bank’s intervention in the foreign exchange market to purchase foreign 
currency will affect its financial performance depends on how the intervention is financed. If 
reserve money is issued, the policy rate will tend to decline unless money demand increases. 
But money demand is unlikely to increase at a pace that matches a surge in foreign currency 
inflows. In order to maintain monetary control (ie to keep the policy rate close to its target 
level), a central bank can avoid or sterilise the expansionary effects of its foreign exchange 
market intervention via foreign currency operations that reduce the central bank’s net foreign 
assets (issuance of foreign liabilities, implementing offsetting transactions in the foreign 
exchange market) or by implementing domestic operations (selling treasury securities on its 
portfolio, issuing central bank debt or accepting government deposits). These are market-
based instruments for sterilisation. In a number of cases, central banks have also used 
non-market instruments, such as adjusting reserve requirements for commercial banks. The 
choice of sterilisation instruments – or how a central bank finances its acquisition of foreign 
assets – will have different implications for a central bank’s balance sheet, the risks it 
assumes and the costs.  
                                                  
10   For related discussions on central bank balance sheets, see CGFS (2009) and the contributions in this volume 
by Vargas; Rossini et al; and Sidaoui et al. BIS Papers No 57  71
 
 
3.1  Foreign currency operations 
Central banks can limit the impact of foreign asset accumulation on the domestic financial 
system by issuing foreign liabilities or implementing forward or swap transactions in the 
foreign exchange market.  
Most emerging market central banks have large net foreign asset holdings (Graph 5), 
suggesting that they do not rely exclusively on foreign debt issuance to fund foreign asset 
acquisition. Net foreign assets tend to be largest in Asia (in Hong Kong SAR and Singapore, 
net foreign assets are close to 100% of GDP or higher), and lowest in Latin America, with 
many central banks converging to an average of just over 10% (30% in the case of Peru). 




Central bank net foreign assets 
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1  Regional figures are weighted averages based on 2005 GDP and PPP exchange rates. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
 
 
As for forward or swap transactions in the foreign exchange swap market,  some central 
banks buy foreign currency spot, then implement a foreign exchange swap in which they sell 
the foreign currency spot and purchase it forward. The resulting net long forward position has 
no visible impact on the balance sheet until closed, but it is often reported by central banks to 
the IMF under the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS).
11 Appendix Graph A1 
illustrates foreign exchange forward positions for a set of emerging market economies, as 
well as movements in their exchange rates. The increase in net positive foreign currency 
positions in a number of EMEs (eg in Southeast Asia) from around 2005 to 2008, when their 
exchange rates were appreciating, is consistent with an increase in spot purchases of foreign 
currency that were sterilised via swaps. However, in some countries the connection between 
forward positions and the exchange rate is much looser, indicating that foreign exchange 
swap or forward market transactions do not reflect sterilisation along the lines described. 
                                                  
11   The SDDS was one outcome of efforts to improve transparency following the Asian crisis. 72  BIS Papers No 57
 
 
Instead, such positions may be maintained to hedge foreign currency exposures or influence 
liquidity in foreign exchange markets.
12 
Net foreign asset or net long forward positions can be used to make foreign currency 
resources available during periods of financial stress. However, these positions mean that a 
large proportion of foreign asset acquisition will typically require sterilisation via domestic 
operations, leading to the sterilisation costs cited earlier. 
3.2 Domestic  operations 
Sterilisation via repo operations has been facilitated by the availability of government debt 
securities that can be presented as collateral.
13 While there are prohibitions (constitutional or 
legislative) on central bank financing of the government in many countries, notably in central 
and eastern Europe and Latin America, central bank purchases of government bonds in the 
secondary market have been allowed in many EMEs for some years now (Hawkins (2003, 
Table 6)). Furthermore, issuance of government debt securities in EMEs has risen; by June 
2010, it had reached around $5 trillion for a set of larger EMEs, compared with slightly under 
$1 trillion in December 1999.  
Remaining maturities of debt instruments have also lengthened (Appendix Table A5). In 
larger EMEs in Asia, remaining maturities rose from 5.3 years in 2000 to 7½ years in 2009. 
Maturities tend to be shorter in Latin America (although they nearly doubled to 4½ years over 
the same period), but have nevertheless lengthened in the past decade, notably in Mexico 
(from 1.4 to 6.4 years). The longest maturities of emerging market debt securities in 2010 
were observed in India (10½ years), Peru (16 years) and South Africa (10.6 years).  
Some central banks issue their own debt instruments. Maturities of central bank debt 
securities have also lengthened, eg Bank Indonesia introduced maturities of up to a year in 
2010 and discouraged holdings of securities with shorter maturities. The People’s Bank of 
China began to issue three-year securities in 2005. Longer maturities imply that sterilisation 
operations could have a more lasting impact on the excess liquidity of the banking system. 
The use of debt securities for sterilisation purposes raises a number of issues.  
First, while markets have deepened, the availability of sterilisation instruments is sometimes 
limited. In particular, Appendix Table A1 shows that, with the exception of Argentina, Brazil, 
India and Indonesia, central bank claims on government represent a small fraction of total 
assets. While central bank securities sometimes provide an alternative, many countries 
(eg  Brazil, India and the Philippines) prohibit the central bank from issuing its own debt 
                                                  
12   Some central banks also acquire foreign assets by making transactions outside the foreign exchange market 
(Moreno (2005), CGFS (2009)); this is sometimes known as “direct intervention”. This approach insulates the 
domestic financial system in some cases but not in others. For example, in Chile foreign assets accumulated 
by the state-owned copper company appear to be held in accounts abroad that are managed by the central 
bank and that do not enter the domestic banking system. If government deposits arising from copper exports 
are matched by central bank foreign assets, accumulation of the latter would have no impact on domestic 
financial intermediation. By contrast, in Mexico the central bank directly purchases foreign exchange from the 
state-owned oil company and the federal government in exchange for pesos (see Sidaoui et al in this volume). 
Since these entities acquire pesos in exchange for the foreign assets deposited in the central bank, the result 
is an increase in the commercial banks’ balance sheets that needs to be sterilised. 
13   Government deposits are also an important source of liquidity drain from the financial system. They appear to 
be economically meaningful in most EMEs (Appendix Table A2) but have been particularly large – ranging 
from 13 to 45% of GDP – in Algeria, Hong Kong SAR, Israel, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Singapore. 
Government deposits rose during the 2000s in most EMEs. A particularly interesting case is that of India, 
which set up an arrangement (the Market Stabilisation Scheme) under which the Reserve Bank of India was 
empowered to “to issue government Treasury bills and medium-duration dated securities for the purpose of 




14 One reason is that such securities could erode liquidity in the government debt 
market, by offering a competing “safe” instrument. Another consideration is that such an 
instrument, like other domestic operations, can mask the fiscal impact of sterilised 
intervention. This could result in significant losses to the central bank and, by extension, to 
the government.  
Second, sterilisation can reduce the central bank’s net creditor position vis-à-vis the market, 
which can in turn weaken the effectiveness of monetary control.
15 For example, when the 
central bank in Colombia becomes a net debtor to the market, excess liquidity is absorbed 
through a central bank facility with an interest rate 1 percentage point lower than the policy 
rate, implying a de facto change in monetary policy. There is also evidence that the pass-
through from the policy rate to certain bank deposit and lending rates declines when the 
central bank is in a net debtor position (Vargas et al (2010), Vargas in this volume).
16 
Third, foreign holdings of domestic debt securities can affect the cost of financing and its 
volatility. Recent estimates by Peires (2010) indicate varying degrees of foreign participation 
in bond markets in EMEs: they are comparatively high in central Europe (25–35% in 2008), 
and lower in other EMEs (15% in Indonesia, 10% or lower in Brazil, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Thailand and Turkey). Using panel data analysis, Peires finds that foreign participation in the 
domestic government bond market significantly lowers long-term government yields and 
does not necessarily imply increased volatility (and might lower it in some cases).
17 While 
lower financing costs are a considerable benefit of more open financial markets, the flip side 
is that monetary authorities might not want to accept lower interest rates if the economy is 
close to capacity during periods of surging capital inflows.  
Furthermore, during periods of exchange rate appreciation, foreign investors may take 
one-sided bets that generate exchange rate volatility. This effect is amplified if foreign 
investors hold a large share of domestic securities, and that share increases during episodes 
of appreciation. This occurred in Peru, where the central bank adopted a number of 
measures to dampen capital inflows in response to sterilised intervention by making it more 
difficult or costly for foreign investors to acquire central bank securities.
18 In addition, during 
periods of financial stress foreign residents might seek to wind down their positions in 
domestic bond markets very quickly. For example, this was the experience of Mexico in the 
aftermath of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (Sidaoui et al (2010), Jara et al (2009)).  
                                                  
14  Vargas notes in his contribution to this volume that Colombia passed a law authorising the central bank to 
issue its own debt securities but none had been issued yet.  
15   Kamil (2008) argues that the risk that the central bank in Colombia might become a net debtor undermined the 
credibility of foreign exchange market intervention to dampen exchange rate appreciation, prompting investors 
to take positions that rendered such intervention ineffective. 
16   The paper by Vargas in this volume notes that remunerated, non-reserve deposits in Colombia are used when 
the central bank becomes a net debtor of the financial system, as the effects of sterilisation on the monetary 
policy stance are neutral. However, these deposits pose complications, including: the possibly of attracting 
capital inflows (if maturities are short); reduced incentives for banks to lend on the interbank market; and 
weaker control over liquidity (if maturities are longer). 
17  Peires (2010, Table 4) finds that foreign investor participation increases government bond yield volatility in 
Korea; lowers it in Malaysia, Mexico and Turkey; and is not significant in other countries (Brazil, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, Poland and Thailand). 
18   The paper by Rossini et al in this volume indicates that the central bank: (i) imposed a 4% fee on purchases or 
sales of central bank paper involving non-residents, in order to limit resale to them; (ii) increased to 120% the 
reserve requirement on local currency deposits for non-residents; and (iii) used certificates of term deposits as 
sterilisation instruments so that non-residents could not access central bank paper indirectly, through the 
resale of other  local currency instruments to non-residents.  74  BIS Papers No 57
 
 
3.3  Reserve requirements  
Central banks have also sterilised by adjusting reserve requirements on bank deposits. 
Graph 6 shows that during the period of strong capital inflows (between 2006 and mid-2008), 
reserve requirements were raised quite frequently in China and India (over certain periods, 
more frequently than policy rates), and were lowered  following the Lehman bankruptcy, 
when capital flows to EMEs reversed. Reserve requirements were later raised again in a 
number of countries.  
Graph 6 
Reserve requirements and reference rates
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7
The vertical line marks the date of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on 15 September, 2008. 
1  On right-hand side scale unless otherwise indicated.    
2  For Brazil, SELIC target rate; for Colombia, minimum
expansion rate; for Peru, reference rate; for China, 1-year lending rate; for India, repo rate; for Turkey, one-week 
repo lending rate (overnight borrowing rate prior to May 2010).   
3    Effective reserve requirement ratio. 
4  Marginal reserve requirements in dashed lines.    
5  For domestic currency.    
6  For major banks.    
7  For 
domestic currency demand and notice deposits, and domestic currency private current accounts.  
Sources: Bloomberg; CEIC; Datastream; national data. 
 
The main disadvantage of reserve requirements is that, if bank reserves are remunerated at 
less than a market rate of interest rate, they impose a distortionary tax on banks that may 
encourage financial disintermediation. Bearing this in mind, the following explanations may 
be offered for why a number of authorities still resort to reserve requirements: (i) they may be BIS Papers No 57  75
 
 
easier to implement; (ii) they do not tend to attract capital inflows as much as higher interest 
rates; (iii) they can serve as an alternative policy instrument; and (iv) they could provide 
some financial stability benefits.
19 
Ease of implementation. Reserve requirements potentially avoid many of the problems of 
sterilisation via domestic operations cited earlier (sterilisation costs to the central bank if not 
fully remunerated, lack of sterilisation instruments, concerns about the central bank’s net 
creditor position). Furthermore, reserve requirements are an instrument available to most 
central banks; indeed, they may be the only instrument that can supplement the policy rate 
when banking supervision and regulation is in a different institution. At the same time, 
adjustments to liquidity involve the banking system’s own balance sheet; so the central bank 
does not directly incur any costs or risks. 
Smaller effect on capital inflows. A dilemma confronting policymakers during periods of 
large capital inflows is that raising interest rates can attract more capital inflows. To avoid this 
dilemma, some central banks have increased domestic reserve requirements instead. The 
reason is that banks can be expected to compensate for the impact of higher reserve 
requirements by adjusting deposit or lending rates in a way that increases their net interest 
margins. An increase in reserve requirements can tighten domestic financing conditions 
without attracting more capital inflows if banks do not raise the deposit rate but rather lending 
rates. Recent experience and some central bank research suggest that banks may indeed 
pass on the costs of an increase in reserve requirements to depositors (by lowering deposit 
rates; see Montoro and Moreno (2011) and Vargas et al (2010)), in order to increase the 
margin between lending and deposit rates.  
Alternative policy instrument. Changes in reserve requirements may be preferred for 
sterilisation purposes when transmission via the policy rate is weak, eg when financial 
markets are underdeveloped; during episodes of financial stress (Quizpe and Rossini 
(2010)); or when policy rates are close to zero. They may also make it easier to resolve 
conflicting objectives. For instance, in the case of a sudden negative external shock that 
leads to a reversal in capital inflows and the sale of foreign reserves, monetary authorities 
may prefer to sterilise by lowering reserve requirements in order to ease monetary 
conditions. In Latin America and central and eastern Europe, reserve requirements fell 
shortly after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, which was consistent with sterilising the 
contractionary effects of foreign currency liquidity provision in foreign exchange markets 
experiencing severe stress. Policy rates were lowered in Latin America starting in December 
2008, after much of the turmoil had passed (Graph 6). This may be useful if changes in the 
policy rate are seen as signalling policymakers’ commitment to inflation stability, while 
changes in reserve requirements are seen as addressing financial stability concerns. An 
important question is whether it is best to use interest rates and reserve requirements so that 
they reinforce each other (eg to raise reserve requirements when the policy rate is also being 
raised) or whether these two instruments could be used in opposing directions, assigned to 
different targets. This last type of policy assignment has been implemented in Turkey:
20 In 
                                                  
19  For a related discussion on the use of reserve requirements, see Montoro and Moreno (2011). 
20  On 11 November 2010, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
(CBRT) announced a large reduction in the overnight borrowing rate (from 5.75% to 1.75%) as well as in the 
late liquidity borrowing rate (from 1.75% to 0%), citing low inflation. The interest rate corridor was also 
widened, to encourage longer-term investments. See Press Release on Summary of the Monetary Policy 
Committee Meeting, no 2010-39, 29 November 2010. This was done in a setting in which reserve 
requirements had been rising. On 12 November, the CBRT announced a 0.5 percentage point increase in the 
Turkish lira required reserve ratio to 6% with immediate effect. This followed an earlier increase of 
0.5 percentage points on 1 October 2010. (The FX required reserve was also increased.) See Press Release 
on Required Reserves, no. 2010-38, 12 November 2010. In 2011, authorities relied more heavily on reserve 
requirements, raising them to a peak of 16% for demand deposits in April while keeping interest rates stable 
(2011 is not shown in graph). 76  BIS Papers No 57
 
 
late 2010, interest rates were lowered sharply, which could dampen exchange rate 
appreciation in the face of a current account deficit and in a setting of low inflation. At the 
same time, reserve requirements were increased, which could restrain credit growth (see the 
paper by Binici and Yörükoğlu in this volume).  
Financial stability benefits. Reserve requirements can act countercyclically, containing 
credit growth (and, by extension, asset price increases) and building a cushion of reserves in 
the upswing of the business cycle; and enabling bank credit to grow during periods of 
stress.
21 Similar countercyclical effects can be achieved by sterilising via open market 
operations. Both types of sterilisation instruments also reduce banking sector currency 
mismatches that could arise from central bank sales of foreign reserves.  
However, these instruments may have different implications for other types of risks. For 
example, reserve requirements may imply lower market risk but greater exposure to rollover 
risks. In particular, reserve requirements lead commercial banks to deposit a certain amount 
of their assets at the central bank (with no flexibility on how much is allocated), while 
domestic monetary operations prompt them to acquire government securities. In the latter 
case, banks are exposed to market risks that they may not be well equipped to handle (in 
EMEs, most bank risk exposure is traditionally in the form of credit risk). Furthermore, risk 
weights on government debt can be significant under Basel II (BCBS (2006, paragraph 53), 
ranging from zero (for ratings AAA to AA–) to 150% (ratings below B–). As recent experience 
shows, sudden changes in the market value of debt and rating downgrades can have a large 
impact on bank balance sheets.   
As for rollover risks, the costs that reserve requirements impose on domestic banks may 
encourage banks to resort to short-term wholesale (domestic or foreign) financing, rather 
than rely on more stable deposits (typically their most important source of funds). The extent 
to which this creates problems will depend on the availability of such financing. 
4.   Implications for domestic money and credit 
How has foreign asset accumulation affected domestic money and credit in EMEs? More 
systematic analysis is needed to answer this question, but an impression can be gained by 
examining the relationship between growth in net foreign assets of the central bank and, 
respectively, reserve money, M2 and credit to the private sector. A positive association could 
imply that sterilisation is incomplete, and the resulting increase in money and credit could 
pose macroeconomic and financial stability concerns.  
Graph 7 illustrates this relationship during two recent periods of capital inflows, the first in the 
2000s prior to the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, and the second during the most recent 
period of recovery of capital inflows. As can be seen, in spite of the complete absence of 
control variables (and bearing in mind the presence of outliers), a positive relationship 
between net foreign asset growth and indicators of money and credit growth is apparent in a 
cross-section of countries prior to the Lehman bankruptcy. However, this relationship has 
broken down in the most recent period. This could reflect more effective sterilisation. 
Alternatively, it could mean that, although foreign assets have grown rapidly in some 
countries, weak growth in demand for money and credit has dampened the extent to which 
this is reflected in faster money growth. 
                                                  
21  At least one central bank – Brazil – has also used reserve requirements in order to target certain vulnerable 




Growth in net foreign assets minus currency in circulation, 
versus growth in various monetary and credit aggregates
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1  Horizontal axis: monetary authorities’ net foreign assets minus currency in circulation. Vertical axis: reserve
money minus currency in circulation, M2 minus currency in circulation, and credit to the private sector minus
currency in circulation, respectively. The dots represent Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, the 
Czech Republic, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the
Philippines, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey and
Venezuela.    
2    Annualised changes between December 2002 and June 2008, in per cent.       
3  Annualised 
changes between March 2009 and the latest available data, in per cent. 
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Datastream. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In the past decade, foreign asset growth has led to significant growth in central bank assets 
in EMEs. As a result, emerging market central bank assets are large – much larger than in 
advanced economy central banks, even after quantitative easing or large-scale asset 
purchases by the latter. Large foreign asset holdings of emerging market central banks 
appear to have been associated with significant costs for central banks, reflecting sterilisation 
costs and possible losses from domestic currency appreciation. In line with this, the return on 
average assets in a sample of emerging market economies has broadly declined during the 
period of strong capital inflows. There also appear to be macroeconomic effects: until 
September 2008, growth in net foreign assets was positively associated with growth in 
reserve money, M2, and credit (all net of currency in circulation). However, this relationship 
has broken down more recently. 78  BIS Papers No 57
 
 
Emerging market authorities have tried to sterilise or limit the impact of foreign asset 
accumulation on the domestic financial system through foreign currency operations (eg by 
issuing foreign liabilities). However, this has not fully offset gross foreign asset growth – 
certainly not in comparison with advanced economies – so that net foreign assets tend to be 
large. Much of the sterilisation by central banks is thus done via domestic operations – 
specifically, sales of treasury or central bank securities. Apart from costs, domestic 
operations raise a number of concerns. First, central bank claims on government are often 
small relative to the size of net foreign assets to be sterilised. While issuing central bank 
securities is a possible alternative, this is not always allowed because it may interfere with 
the smooth functioning of the market for government debt. Second, as a result of sterilisation, 
the central bank could become a net debtor in the domestic market, impairing its ability to 
regulate liquidity and conduct monetary policy. And third, while debt markets in EMEs have 
deepened and maturities of local currency debt securities have lengthened, greater 
participation by foreign investors can complicate sterilisation efforts.  
Some authorities have used reserve requirements on commercial banks as an alternative 
sterilisation tool. Although reserve requirements impose significant costs on banks and could 
encourage financial disintermediation, they have some advantages over interest rates in 
terms of ease of implementation, impact on capital inflows, effectiveness and possible 





Composition of central bank assets  
As a percentage of total assets 
Net foreign assets  Claims on government 
 
2002 Latest 2002 Latest 
Emerging  Asia     
China 49.7  84.9  6.2  6.2 
Hong Kong SAR  99.8  100.0  …  … 
India  71.3 79.1 25.4 18.8 
Indonesia  29.4 71.6 46.9 24.0 
Korea 85.6  87.3  3.0  5.4 
Malaysia 79.4  70.3  0.4  0.6 
Philippines  46.4 78.8 18.0 11.2 
Singapore 95.2  96.0  3.9  2.5 
Thailand 62.9  92.3  4.6  5.4 
Latin  America      
Argentina  –12.4 56.4 48.8 39.3 
Brazil  9.5 38.0 64.4 54.8 
Chile 62.7  82.6  29.6  6.4 
Colombia 83.9  88.1  6.4  2.2 
Mexico 71.3  89.7  …  … 
Peru 87.8  96.0  0.9  … 
Venezuela 80.5  85.1  8.3  3.1 
CEE      
Czech Republic  93.0  95.9  1.4  … 
Hungary 34.2  64.1  32.8  2.5 
Poland …  91.2  …  … 
Russia 57.7  91.1  23.0  2.2 
Turkey –17.3  66.4  37.7  6.6 
Other  EMEs      
Algeria 86.3  98.5  6.6  0.1 
Israel 88.4  87.3  8.6  7.5 
South Africa  30.0  82.1  40.4  3.2 























Share of central bank liabilities in total assets, in per cent 
  Reserve money  
other than currency  Claims by non-residents  Bonds and securities  Government deposits  Capital account and  
other items (net) 
  2002 Latest 2002 Latest 2002 Latest 2002 Latest 2002 Latest 
Asia             
China  60.8  52.0 1.0 0.6  3.2  16.8  6.7 13.3 –9.4 –0.0 
Hong Kong SAR  16.0  40.4 0.2 0.0  …  … 36.2 27.3 34.0 21.8 
India  17.7  22.3 1.0 1.7  …  … 0.0 2.3  25.5  19.6 
Indonesia  12.5 41.4 15.5  2.8  …  5.4 17.6  7.9  27.6  6.5 
Korea  10.7 9.8 5.9 5.5  61.8  44.7 6.6  1.3  3.3  29.5 
Malaysia  9.5 1.2 1.6  13.9  …  … 4.6  6.1  20.1 5.8 
Philippines  8.4 18.8 28.0  3.6  …  … 6.7  6.0  20.5  17.5 
Singapore  5.1 6.0 0.9 1.5  …  … 63.6  43.1  22.1 42.1 
Thailand  2.5 1.6  10.0 2.1 4.8  22.3 2.9  7.3  47.3 5.7 
Latin America              
Argentina  11.7  26.2  42.4 3.7 2.7  25.1 0.1  3.5  29.1  13.5 
Brazil  33.0 23.7 20.7  2.4  …  … 20.2  29.2  –4.4  2.1 
Chile  36.5  64.3 1.7 4.6  45.9  18.5 2.9  1.9  2.4  –19.3 
Colombia  4.7  13.5 2.7 5.3  …  … 0.8  5.7  58.0  13.2 
Mexico  … …  0.8  3.5  17.6  0.1 13.9  41.1  –2.7 –4.6 
Peru  55.9  29.3  10.8 4.0 5.4  23.1 6.5  22.2  5.9 3.4 
Venezuela  40.8  113.6 4.1  11.8 2.0  11.1 3.9  10.4  49.0  –49.2 
CEE              
Czech Republic  4.7 6.5 0.6 3.4  …  … 10.7 11.6 –4.3  –14.7 
Hungary  9.9  3.2 32.4 33.0  3.8  8.4  5.3 11.7 –3.7  –13.6 
Poland  …  6.7 …  8.5 … … …  9.5 …  13.1 
Russia  17.5  11.1 9.7 1.7  …  … 14.9 37.0 22.8 18.1 
Turkey  17.1 35.6 76.1 19.1  …  … 7.3 9.8  –21.2 4.0 
Other EMEs               
Algeria  8.8 3.1 7.0 1.5  …  … 22.2 41.0 10.9 15.5 
Israel  41.2  40.0 0.6 5.2  …  … 40.5 49.1  5.5 –7.7 
Saudi Arabia  12.2  5.0 … … … …  32.8 60.8 21.7 28.3 
South Africa  11.8 16.4 18.8  6.8  …  …  2.4 37.0 –2.6  2.2 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.  






  Outstanding year-end position  As a percentage of 
  In billions of US dollars  % of 
GDP Short-term external debt
2 M2 
  02 07 08 10 10 02 07 08 10 02 07 08 10 
Asia
3  945  2,907  3,318  4,672 55  524  449  586  433 30 35 35 36 
China  286 1,528 1,946 2,847  50 1,369 1,249  1,868  1,092 13 28 28 26 
Hong Kong SAR  113 147 178 261 116 197 144 189 190  25  19  22  28 
India  67  267  247  263 19  983  340  338  227 19 28 27 19 
Indonesia  31 55 49 86 13  228  185  174  192 31 31 30 33 
Korea  121  262  200  287 29  271  176  172  171 17 19 19 19 
Malaysia  32  101 91  102 47  331  447  402  365 25 40 35 29 
Philippines  13 30 33 53 28  174  227  406  349 38 39 43 55 
Singapore  82 163 174 226 104 141 127 150 153  76  77  75  69 
Thailand  38 85  108  166 53  387  867  998  1,058 25 31 38 42 
Latin America
  140  397  440  547 13  127  238  362  270 57 47 49  ... 
Argentina  10 44 44 46 13 57  200  279  399 42 51 49 41 
Brazil  37  179  193  281 14  124  292  364  253 20 20 24 19 
Chile  15 17 23 27 14  140 86  113  123 47 18 28 23 
Colombia  10 20 23 26  9  207  201  390  325 39 26 28 23 
Mexico  50 86 94  112 11  107  254  240  314 15 15 18 16 
Peru  9  27  30  44  29 136 284 248 312 181 165 157 144 
Venezuela  8 24 33 11  4  119  347  901  166 54 33 36  ... 
CEE
4, 5  165 753 703 776  20 264 153 144 188  ...  74  84  62 
Czech Republic  24 35 37 42 22  437  200  236  372 44 25 27 27 
Hungary  10 24 34 42 32  110 88 99  123 29 29 43 52 
Poland  30 66 62 94 21  218  245  178  257 36 29 28 37 
Russia  44  467  413  449 31  275  493  490  691 66 86 86 75 
Turkey  27 73 70 77 11  143  124  119  132 41 23 24 19 
Other  71  359  510  541 49  339  605  993  670 35 72 89 84 
Israel  24 28 42 67 33  523  587  556  485 47 34 44 56 
Saudi Arabia
5  42 301 438 436 102 433  1,058  2,215  1,270  51 169 207 182 
South Africa  6 29 30 38 11 62  170  207  254  7 12 16 13 
1  Regional aggregates for the outstanding year-end position of foreign exchange reserves are the sum of the 
economies listed, simple averages otherwise.    
2  Short-term external debt defined as short-term liabilities to 
BIS reporting banks (consolidated cross-border claims of all BIS reporting banks on countries outside the 
reporting area with a maturity up to and including one year, plus international debt securities outstanding with a 
maturity of up to one year).       
3  Countries  shown  plus  Chinese  Taipei.    
4  Central  and  eastern  Europe: 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Turkey.    
5  For Saudi Arabia, excluding investment in foreign securities. 
Sources: IMF; Thompson Reuters; national data. 
  




Estimates of sterilisation costs and valuation losses  


















Jun 08  Sep 10  Jun 08  Sep 10  Jun 08  Sep 10  Jun 08  Sep 10 
Asia                         
China  1,809  2,648  0.8  2.6  0.4  1.4  4.7  5.2 
Hong Kong SAR  152  256  –1.3  –0.1  –1.0  –0.1  7.3  12.2 
India  302  265  5.2  6.0  1.4  1.2  2.7  2.1 
Indonesia  57  80  5.6  6.1  0.7  0.8  1.3  1.3 
Korea  258  285  2.1  2.1  0.6  0.7  2.7  3.1 
Malaysia  125  97  0.5  2.5  0.3  1.1  6.3  4.4 
Philippines  32  45  3.0  3.9  0.6  1.0  2.1  2.6 
Singapore  177  215  –2.1  0.0  –1.9  0.0  9.1  10.8 
Thailand  103  157  0.3  1.4  0.1  0.8  4.0  5.4 
Latin America                         
Argentina  45  46  10.7  12.1  1.8  1.9  1.7  1.6 
Brazil  200  268  9.1  9.4  1.1  1.4  1.2  1.5 
Chile  20  26  –2.6  –0.1  –0.3  0.0  1.2  1.4 
Colombia  22  25  3.0  1.3  0.3  0.1  0.9  0.9 
Mexico  93  108  4.9  4.6  0.4  0.5  0.9  1.2 
Peru  35  40  2.4  2.6  0.7  0.8  3.0  2.9 
Venezuela  23  10  14.2  14.2  1.4  0.9  1.0  0.6 
CEE                         
Czech Republic  38  44  0.8  0.5  0.1  0.1  1.7  2.3 
Hungary  27  44  5.5  4.9  0.9  1.8  1.7  3.7 
Poland  83  99  3.0  3.2  0.5  0.7  1.5  2.2 
Russia  555  458  2.3  3.2  0.9  1.1  3.9  3.6 
Turkey  76  76  14.6  7.1  1.6  0.8  1.1  1.2 
Other EMEs                          
Algeria  133  155  0.3  3.4  0.2  3.9  8.9  11.6 
Israel  31  65  0.9  1.4  0.1  0.5  1.5  3.1 
Saudi Arabia  377  413  –0.1  0.0  –0.1  0.0  9.8  11.0 
South Africa  31  36  9.1  5.7  1.1  0.6  1.2  1.1 
1  Assumes that FX reserves are invested in one-year sector bonds and that domestic liabilities have one-
month average maturity.    
2  Domestic borrowing cost (mostly one-month interbank rate) minus the investment 
rate (basket of one-year government bond rates (65% USD, 25% EUR, 5% JPY and 5% GBP)).       
3  The 
financial cost for the FX reserves (FX reserves multiplied by the interest rate differential) as a percentage of the 
nominal GDP per annum.    
4  10% valuation loss on the FX reserves as a percentage of the nominal GDP per 
annum. 
Sources: IMF; CEIC; Datastream; Bloomberg; JPMorgan Chase; national data; BIS calculations.  




Maturity of domestic central government debt outstanding
1 
Average original and remaining maturity in years² 
2000 2007 2009 
 
Original  Remaining 
maturity  Original  Remaining 
maturity  Original  Remaining 
maturity 
Asia        
China  ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Hong  Kong  SAR  5.6 3.2 6.6 3.6 6.6 3.4 
India  13.0 [7.1] 14.7 10.0 13.8 10.5 
Korea  4.0 2.4 7.0 4.4 7.6 4.6 
Indonesia  5.6 6.0  13.3  12.7 6.7 6.1 
Malaysia  ... 5.0  10.0 5.4 9.2 5.3 
Philippines  8.6 5.8 7.8 5.0  ...  ... 
Singapore  4.3 2.7 6.8 3.6 6.2 3.2 
Thailand  ...  ... 9.7 5.8  10.2 5.8 
Latin  America        
Argentina  ...  ... 17.2 10.4 16.2 10.0 
Brazil  ...  2.7 ...  3.0 ...  3.4 
Chile  ... ...  7.8  6.8 ... ... 
Colombia  5.1 3.6 7.7 4.1 8.8 5.1 
Mexico  ...  1.4 ...  5.7 ...  6.4 
Peru  ... [6.4] 18.5 16.5 19.6 16.0 
Venezuela  ...  2.5 ...  14.9 ...  3.9 
C E E         
Czech Rep  5.2  3.4  8.5 5.6 9.6 5.9 
Hungary  ... 3.9 6.8 4.0 5.3 2.7 
Poland  4.2 2.6 8.0 4.3 7.9 4.1 
Russia  8.7  4.4 13.1  8.9 11.3  7.4 
Turkey  1.7 1.0 3.8 1.1 4.0 1.9 
Other  EMEs          
Israel  8.5  6.2 11.0  6.2 11.1  6.3 
Saudi  Arabia ...  6.0 ...  4.2 ...  3.3 
South Africa  17.6  9.2 17.3  8.3 18.0 10.6 
1  Includes bonds, notes and money market instruments. Average original and remaining maturities of central 
government amounts outstanding reported in Table 2e of the Working Group survey. Numbers in brackets 
represent the results of the 2001 survey published in BIS (2002, Table 6).    ²  These estimates should be 
regarded as indicative and may not be strictly comparable across countries. 
Sources: CGFS Working Group survey; BIS, http://www.bis.org/statistics/secstats.htm item D4. 
 
  




Exchange rate and aggregate positions in FX forwards and futures 
against domestic currency 
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1  2002 = 100; an increase indicates appreciation of the local currency.    
2  Aggregate net, short (–) and long (+) 
positions in forwards and futures in foreign currencies vis-à-vis the domestic currency (including the forward leg of 
currency swaps); in billions of US dollars. 
Source: IMF, Data Template on International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity. 
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Graph A1 (cont) 
Exchange rate and aggregate positions in FX forwards and futures 
against domestic currency 
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1  2002 = 100; an increase indicates appreciation of the local currency.    
2  Aggregate net, short (–) and long (+) 
positions in forwards and futures in foreign currencies vis-à-vis the domestic currency (including the forward leg of 
currency swaps); in billions of US dollars. 
Source: IMF, Data Template on International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity.  
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